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ADMISSIBILITY OF LABORATORY REPORTS
Paul C. Giannelli
Professor of Law
Case Western Reserve University
The admissibility of laboratory reports at a criminal trial raises a number of evidentiary issues. First,
the report must be authenticated. See Fed. R. Evid.
901(a); State v. Kraft, 134 N.J. Super. 416, 341 A.2d
373 (1975) (laboratory report not authenticated).
Since, however, most reports in criminal cases are
prepared by government laboratories, they often
qualify as self-authenticating documents, and thus
may be admitted without extrinsic evidence. See
Fed. R. Evid. 902. Second, under the original writing
("best evidence") rule, the admission of a written report requires that the original be accounted for or
produced. See Fed. R. Evid 1002. An exception, however, is typically recognized for public records. Under
this exception certified copies of public records are
admissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 1005.
The most serious obstacle to the admission of laboratory reports is the hearsay rule, an issue which
typically involves the applicability of the public records, business records, and recorded recollection exceptions. In addition, the admission of laboratory reports raises confrontation issues. This article examines these issues.
FEDERAL TRIALS
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the federal courts generally admitted laboratory reports under the business or public records exceptions to the hearsay rule. E.g., U.S. v. Frattini, 501
F.2d 1234, 1235-36 (2d Cir. 1974) (lab report identifying
substance as cocaine); U.S. v. Parker, 491 F.2d 517,
520 (8th Cir. 1973) (lab report identifying substance as
heroin), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974); Government
of the Virgin Islands v. St. Ange, 458 F.2d 981, 982 (3d
Cir. 1972) (hospital lab report identifying sperm on
vaginal smear); Kay v. U.S., 255 F.2d 476, 480 (4th Cir.)
(lab report of blood-alcohol test), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 825 (1958); U.S. v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698, 699 (7th
Cir. 1957) (lab report identifying substance as heroin).
See generally lmwinkelried, The Constitutionality of

Introducing Evaluative Laboratory Reports Against
Criminal Defendants, 30 Hastings L.J. 621 (1979). The
enactm.ent of the Federal Rules, however, has cast
doubt on the admissibility of laboratory reports
under these exceptions.
Public Records Exception
Federal Rule 803(8) recognizes a hearsay exception for public records. It provides for the admissibility of:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in
any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A)
the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which
matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however,
in criminal cases matters observed by police officers
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in
criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness.

Laboratory reports fall within subsection (C) of the
rule. In U.S. v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977), the
Second Circuit wrote, "It seems indisputable to us
that the chemist's official report and worksheet ...
can be characterized as reports of 'factual findings
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to
authority granted by law.'" /d. at 67. As the rule explicitly provides, investigative reports are not admissible in criminal cases when offered against the accused; they are, however, admissible if offered
against the prosecution. But see State v. Manke, 328
N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1982) (chemist's report admitted
under N.D. Rule 803(8)(C)). See generally Annat., 47
A.L.R. Fed. 321 (1980) (collecting cases decided
under Rule 803(8)(C)).
The court in Oates also concluded that laboratory
reports came within subsection (B) of the rule, a conclusion which raises two issues. The first issue involved the meaning of the term "law enforcement
personnel.'' The court held that chemists employed
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"'at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of
the defendant.'" 590 F.2d at 793, quoting S. Rep. No
1277, 93d Gong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S·. Coc
Con g. & Ad. News 7051, 7064. Under this view, it
could be argued that laboratory analyses are far
enough removed from such confrontations that the}
are not adversarial encounters and thus not inadmi~
sible under the police records exclusion.
The police records exclusion raises one addition<:
issue. On its face, Rule 803(8)(B) would appear to ex·
elude all police records, whether offered by the pros
ecution or the defense. In this respect, subsection (I
differs from subsection (C) which excludes evaluative reports in criminal cases only when offered by
the prosecution. In U.S. v. Smith, 521F.2d 957 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), the D.C. Circuit addressed this issue:
"[T)he apparently absolute language of 803(8)(B) had
its origin in congressional concern that use of reports against defendants would be unfair.'' /d. at 96E
n.24. Accordingly, "803(8)(B) should be read, in accordance with the obvious intent of Congress and in
harmony with 803(8)(C), to authorize the admission o
the reports of police officers and other law enforcement personnel at the request of the defendant in a
criminal case." /d. Ohio Rule 803(8)(B) expressly permits the introduction of police records when offered
by the defendant.

by the U.S. Customs Service were "law enforcement
personnel" within the meaning of the rule. According
to the court, "any officer or employee of a governmental agency which has law enforcement responsibilities" qualifies as law enforcement personnel. 560
F.2d at 68 ("Chemists at the laboratory are, without
question, important participants in the prosecutorial
effort."). See also U.S. v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793,
(9th Cir. 1979) (customs inspector at border qualifies
as "law enforcement personnel" under Rule 803(8)(B)),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1049 (1978); U.S. v. Ruffin, 575
F.2d 346, 356 (2d Cir. 1978) (IRS personnel who gather
data and information routinely used in criminal prosecutions perform a law enforcement function).
The secqnd issue concerns the scope of the police
records exclusion in Rule 803(8)(B). See generally Annot., 37 A.L.R. Fed. 831 (1978) (collecting cases decided under Rule 803(8)(B)'s police records
exclusion). According to the Senate Report, this exclusion was based on the belief that "observations
by police officers at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant are not as reliable as
observations by public officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation
between the police and the defendant in criminal
cases." S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Gong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Gong. and Ad. News 7051,
7064. In addition, the legislative history indicates
that Congress was concerned with the confrontation
problems raised by the use of police records in criminal trials. See U.S. v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 78 (2d Cir.
1977) ("[T)he pervasive fear of the draftsmen and of
Congress that interference with an accused's right to
confrontation would occur was the reason why in
criminal cases evaluative reports of government
agencies and law enforcement reports were expressly denied the benefit to which they might otherwise
be entitled under FRE 803(8).").

Relationship Between Public Records and
Other Exceptions
Another area of uncertainty concerns the relation·
ship between the public records exception and othe
hearsay exceptions. See generally 4 D. Louise II & C.
Mueller, Federal Evidence§§ 452 & 456 (1980); 4 J.
Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence , 803
(6)[07] (1981); Annat., 56 A.L.R. Fed. 168 (1982).
Several courts have held that documents subject
to exclusion under the public records exception are
not admissible under any other hearsay exception.
This interpretation may preclude the admissibility of
laboratory reports as -business records, Rule 803(6),
or as recorded recollection, Rule 803(5). In U.S. v.
Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977), the prosecution argued that a laboratory report identifying a substance
as heroin was admissible under the business record:
exception. Although the court recognized that as a
general rule hearsay evidence failing to meet therequirements of one exception may nonetheless satisfy the standards of another exception, id. at 66, it
found that the "clear legislative intent" of excluding
police and investigative reports under Rule 803(8)
precluded the admissibility of such reports under
any other exception. /d. at 68, 72 & 77. Accord U.S. v.
Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir. 1980) (FBI report);
U.S. v. Cain, 615 F.2d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 1980) (prison
escape report); U.S. v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 355-56 (2d
Cir. 1978) (IRS computer printouts); U.S. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(government internal memoranda and letters).
Other courts have disagreed with Oates, holding
that Congress, by excluding police and investigative
reports under Rule 803(8), intended to exclude such
reports only when admitted in lieu of the testimony
of the declarant. According to these courts, "[t]he ac·

In Oates, the court adopted a literal interpretation
of the police records exclusion, under which all police reports are automatically excluded. Other courts,
however, have held that the police records exclusion
applies only to observations made during "adversarial confrontations." For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that "Congress did not intend to exclude [police] records of routine, nonadversarial matters .... " U.S. v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir.
1979) (customs officer's recording of license plate
numbers admissible), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1049
(1978). See a/so U.S. v. Coleman, 631 F.2d 908,910-12
(D,C. Cir. 1980) (chain of custody documents admissible); U.S. v. Hernandez-Rajas, 617 F.2d 533, 535 (9th
Cir.) (Rule 803(8)(B) police records exclusion inapplicable to warrant of deportation), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 864 (1980); U.S. v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 576 F.2d 388, 391 (1st Cir. 1978) (marshall's
return on service of injunction admissible); U.S. v.
Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1976) (routine recording of serial numbers unrelated to commission of
crime admissible).
In Orozco, the court focused on the Senate Report's
language concerning the "adversarial nature of the
confrontation" between the police and the defendant
2

companying testimony of the author minimizes the
danger of unreliability by giving the trier of fB:ct the
opportunity to weigh his credibility and cons1der the
circumstances surrounding preparation of the
report." U.S. v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1980)
(Social Security forms admitted as business records
where the preparers testified). Accord U.S. v. Sawyer,
607 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1979) (recorded recollections of IRS agent who testified at trial admissible
under recorded recollection exception notwithstanding their inadmissibility under Rule 803(8)(B)), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980). See also Abdel v. U.S.,
670 F.2d 73, 75n. 3 (7th Cir. 1982).
Under this view, if a laboratory report qualifies as
recorded recollection or as a business record and the
declarant also testifies, the report is admissible.
Thus, in U.S. v. Coleman, 631 F.2d 908, 915 (D.C. Cir.
1980), the D.C. Circuit upheld the admission of DEA
analysis forms where the examining chemist testified but reversed as to those counts where a supervisi~g chemist testified in lieu of the examining
chemist.

dentally to the systematic conduct of the police business. /d. at 700.

Accord U.S. v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 966-67 (D.C. Cir.
1975); U.S. v. Brown, 451 F.2d 1231, 1233-34 (5th Cir.
1971); Sanchez v. U.S., 293 F.2d 260, 269 (8th Cir.
1961).
The courts applying the litigation records rule,
however, generally have not extended it to laboratory
reports. See U.S. v. Frattini, 501 F.2d 1234, 1235 (2d
Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698, 699 (7th Cir.
1957)·/n re Nelson, 83 Misc. 2d 1081, 1083-84,374
N.Y.s'.2d 982, 984-86 (Fam. Ct. 1975). For example, in
U.S. v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579, 45 C.M.R. 353 (1972), the
court stated: "We are not persuaded that a chemical
examiner's report is made principally for the purpose
of prosecution." /d. at 582, 45 C.M.R. at 356. In contrast, in State v. Henderson, 554 S.W.2d 117 (Tenn.
1977), the court stated that laboratory reports "realistically cannot be said to have been prepared for any
reason other than their potential litigation value." /d.
at 120. See also U.S. v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 967 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (police reports not admissible if offered by
the prosecution).

Business Records Exception
If not precluded by the police records exclusion of
Rule 803(8), laboratory reports may be admissible as
business records under Rule 803(6). Fed. R. Evid.
803(6) provides for the admissibility of:

Recorded Recollection Exception
If not inadmissible due to the police records exclusion of Rule 803(8), laboratory reports may be admissible as recorded recollection under Rule 803(5).
For example, in U.S. v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279 (9th
Cir. 1976), the Ninth Circuit upheld the admissibility
of a chemist's report identifying a substance as cocaine where the chemist testified that he had analyzed the substance and prepared the report but had
no independent recollection of the tests. The chemist did testify, however, that the report was accurate
and was prepared contemporaneously with the tests.

A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in
any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diag·
noses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if
it was the regular practice of that business activity to
make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or
other qualified witness, unless the source of information
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate
lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in
this paragraph includes business, institution, associa·
tion, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind,
whether or not conducted for profit.

STATE TRIALS

A minority of jurisdictions have excluded laboratory reports as a matter of evidence law. E.g, People
v. Domin, 71 Mich. App. 315,248 N.W.2d 250 (1976)
(lab report identifying substance as LSD is inadmissible hearsay); State v. Russell, 114 N.H. 222, 317
A.2d 781 (1974) (lab report identifying substance as
marihuana does not qualify as a business record);
Bennett v. State, 448 P.2d 253 (Okla. Grim. 1968) (psychiatric report inadmissible). In addition, several
courts have excluded laboratory reports on constitutional grounds. See infra.
Most state courts that have considered the admissibility of laboratory reports have ruled that they are
admissible. Some have used the business records
exception. E.g., Henson v. State, 332 A.2d 773, 775
(Del. 1975) (hospital record of rape victim examination); State v. Rhone, 555 S.W.2d 839, 841-42 (Mo.
1977) (lab report of clothing and debris); State v.
Taylor, 486 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Mo. 1972) (lab report of
debris); People v. Porter, 46 A.D. 2d 307, 311, 362
N.Y.S.2d 249, 255 (1974) (lab report of blood-alcohol
test); Burleson v. State, 585 S.W.2d 711, 712-13 (Tex.
Grim. 1979) (autopsy report); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash.
2d 112, 120-21, 542 P.2d 782, 787 (1975) (lab report of
blood examination); State v. Ecklund, 30 Wash. App.

The rule expressly provides that "opinions" are admissible under this exception. In contrast, Ohio Rule
803(6) does not contain the term "opinions."
The principal issue involves the trustworthiness
clause of the rule, under which business records are
excludable if "the source of information or the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate
lack of trustworthiness." One factor affecting reliability is the motive of the person who prepares the
record-whether the record was "prepared with an
eye toward litigation." U.S. v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957,
966 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The "litigation records" rule is
derived from Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
In U.S. v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1957), the
Seventh Circuit wrote:
[E]ven if memoranda ... are regularly prepared by law en·
forcement officers, they lack the necessary earmarks of
reliability and trustworthiness. Their source and the
nature and manner of their compilation unavoidably dictate that they are inadmissible under [the Federal Busi·
ness Records Act]. They are also subject to objection
that such utility as they possess relates primarily to
prosecution of suspected law breakers, and only inci·
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against" the accused. Thus, a literal interpretation of
the Confrontation Clause would preclude the prosecution from introducing any hearsay statement, notwithstanding the applicability of a recognized hearsay exception. However, the SuprE;!me Court has rejected this interpretation. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 63 (1980) ("[l]f thus applied, the Clause would
abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result
long rejected as unintended and too extreme.").
The Colifrontation Clause also could be interpreted as requiring only the right to cross-examine incourt witnesses and not out-of-court declarants. See
5 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 1397 (Chadbourn Rev.
1974). Under this view, all recognized hearsay exceptions would satisfy constitutional requirements. The
Supreme Court has also rejected this view:

313, 319, 633 P.2d 933, 936-37 (1981) (lab report of
serological examination).
Other courts have relied on the public records exception in upholding the admissibility of laboratory
reports. E.g., Seals v. State, 282 Ala. 586, 604, 213
So.2d 645, 662-63 (1968) (toxicologist report); State v.
Snider, 168 Mont. 220, 229,541 P.2d 1204, 1209 (1975)
(lab report identifying subtance as marihuana); In re
KevinG., 80 Misc. 2d 517, 519,363 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1002
(Fam. Ct. 1975) (lab report identifying substance as
heroin). In addition, some jurisdictions have enacted
statutes providing for the admissibility of certain
types of reports, such as breathalyzer results. See
Wester v. State, 528 P.2d 1179, 1189 (197 4) (Alaska
1974); State v. Larochelle, 112 N.H. 392, 394, 297 A.2d
223, 224 (1972). Most of these cases, however, predate the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence
and their adoption by the states. The admissibility of
laboratory reports in jurisdictions that have adopted
the Federal Rules raises the same issues discussed
above. The Military Rules, however, explicitly provide
for the admissibility of "forensic laboratory reports"
as business and public records. Mil. R. Evid. 803(6)
and (8).
A number of jurisdictions have enacted statutes
that provide for the admissibility of laboratory reports if the defendant does not request the presence
of the examiner prior to trial. E.g., Iowa Code Ann. §
691.2 (West 1979); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A §
1112(1) (1983). Some states, in addition to requiring a
defense request for the presence of the analyst at
trial, require the prosecution to notify the defense of
its intention to use the laboratory report at trial. Md.
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann.§ 10-306 (1980) (intoxication tests); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§ 2925.51(C) (Baldwin 1982) (controlled substances). See State v.
Reese, 56 Ohio App. 2d 278, 382 N.E.2d 1193 (1978)
(failure to serve copy of lab report on defendant renders report inadmissible). A defendant's failure torequest the presence of the examiner has been held to
constitute a waiver of the right to confrontation.
State v. Davison, 245 N.W.2d 321 (Iowa 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); State v. Kramer, 231 N.W.2d
874 (Iowa 1975). See also State v. Christianson, 404
A.2d 999 (Me. 1979) (confrontation issue not raised).

While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and
the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest
that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation
Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the
rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed
historically at common law. Our decisions have never established such a congruence; indeed, we have more than
once found a violation of confrontation values even
though the statements in issue were admitted under an
arguably recognized hearsay exception .... The converse is equally true: merely because evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does
not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation
rights have been denied. California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 155-56 (1970).

See also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) ("It
seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule
stem from the same roots. But this Court has never
equated the two, and we decline to do so now.").
The courts have disagreed over whether the admission of laboratory reports violates the Confrontation
Clause. A number of courts have rejected the constitutional argument. E.g., Kay v. U.S., 255 F.2d 476,
480-81 (4th Cir.) (blood-alcohol report), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 825 (1958); U.S. ex ref. Lurry v. Johnson, 378
F. Supp. 818,822 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (hospital record of
rape victim examination); Robertson v. Cox, 320 F.
Supp. 900 (W.O. Va. 1970) (lab report identifying seminal fluid); Henson v. State, 332 A.2d 773, 775 (Del.
1975) (hospital record of rape victim examination);
Groverv. State, 41 Md. App. 705,710-11.398 A.2d 528,
531 (1979) (autopsy report); Commonwealth v. Franks,
359 Mass. 577,580-81,270 N.E.2d 837,839-40 (1971)
(hospital report identifying sperm); Commonwealth v.
Harvard, 356 Mass. 452, 461-62, 253 N.E.2d 346,
351-52 (1969) (lab report identifying substance as
marihuana); State v. Larochelle, 112 N.H. 392, 396-97,
297 A.2d 223, 226 (1972) (breathalyzer results); Burleson v. State, 585 S.W.2d 711,712-13 (Tex. Grim. 1979)
(autopsy report); Robertson v. Commonwealth, 211
Va. 62, 65, 175 S.E.2d 260, 262-63 (1970) (lab report
identifying seminal fluid); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d
112, 116-19, 542 P.2d 782, 785-86 (1975) (laboratory report of blood test).
Other courts have found a confrontation violation
where laboratory reports have been admitted in evi-

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

Even if laboratory reports are admissible under a
hearsay exception, the Confrontation Clause might
require exclusion. The Sixth Amendment provides
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." This clause was held binding upon
the States. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). For
discussions of the relationship between the hearsay
rule and the Confrontation Clause, see 4 D. Louisell
& C. Mueller, Federal Evidence§ 418 (1980); 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence§ 800[04]
(1981); Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77 Mich.
L. Rev. 1185 (1979); Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for
Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567 (1978).
A hearsay declarant is, in effect, a "witness
4

dence. See Steward v. Cowan, 528 F.2d 79, 85 (6th
Cir. 1976) (ballistics report); Kienlen v. U.S., 437 F.2d
843, 848-49 (10th Cir. 1971) (psychiatric report); Ph-illips v. Neil, 452 F.2d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1971) (psychiatric report); cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 (1972); People
v. Johnson, 11 Ill. App. 3d 395, 401-02, 296 N.E.2d 763,
768 (1973) (psychiatric report); Gregory v. State, 40
Md. App. 297, 325, 391 A.2d 437, 454 (1978) (psychiatric report); State v. Russell, 114 N.H. 223, 224-25,
317 A.2d 781, 782 (1974) (lab report identifying substance as marihuana); Commonwealth v. McCloud,
457 Pa. 310, 315-17, 322 A.2d 653,657 (1974) (autopsy
report); State v. Henderson, 554 S.W.2d 117, 122
(Tenn. 1977) (lab report identifying substances as
LSD and marihuana).
These cases, however, were decided prior to the
Supreme Court's latest confrontation decision. In
Roberts v. Ohio, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the Court set forth
a two-step analysis for applying the Confrontation
Clause. First, the Confrontation Clause "normally requires a showing that [the declarant] is unavailable."
/d. at 66. Second, even if the declarant is unavailable,
the hearsay statement must bear "adequate indicia
of reliability." /d.

authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain
his presence at trial." /d. at 724-25. In Roberts,. the
Court reaffirmed this test and added the following
explanation:
The law does not require the doing of a futile act. Thus,
if no possibility of procuring the witness exists (as, for
example, the witness' intervening death), "good faith"
demands nothing of the prosecution. But if there is a
possibility, albeit remote, that affirmative measures
might produce the declarant, the obligation of good faith
may demand their effectuation. "The lengths to which
the prosecution must go to produce a witness ... is a
question of reasonableness." ... The ultimate question
is whether the witness is unavailable despite good-faith
efforts undertaken prior to trial to locate and present
that witness. As with other evidentiary proponents, the
prosecution bears the burden of establishing this predicate. 448 U.S. at 74-75.

Thus, in most cases a laboratory analyst would have
to testify unless he is unavailable. See generally
Note, Confrontation and the Unavailable Witness:
Searching for a Standard, 18 Val. U.L. Rev. 193 (1983).
In Roberts, however, the Court recognized an exception to the unavailability requirement. In a footnote, the Court stated that a "demonstration of unavailability, however, is not always required." 448 U.S.
at 65 n.7. The Court cited Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74
(1970), as an example of a case in which the Court
"found the utility of trial confrontation so remote
that it did not require the prosecution to produce a
seemingly available witness." 448 U.S. at 65 n.7. Justice Harlan, in his Dutton concurrence, cited the business and public records exceptions, including a
case admitting laboratory reports, Kay v. U.S., 255
F.2d 476 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 358 U.S. 825 (1958), as
examples of hearsay exceptions in which the production of the declarant would be "of small utility to a
defendant." 400 U.S. at 96. Justice Harlan's view,
however, seems questionable. The Second Circuit in
Oates outlined a number of areas that would be grist
for cross-examination, such as whether the analyst
was qualified, whether proper procedures were followed, whether the procedures and analysis used
were recognized in the profession as being reliable
and, if instrumentation was employed, whether it
was in good working order. 560 F.2d at 45 & 82. See
also Phillips v. Neil, 452, F.2d 337,348 (6th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 (1972); Commonwealth v.
McCloud, 457 Pa. 310, 313, 322 A.2d 653, 655 (1974)
(cross-examination important because experts often
give conflicting opinions); Advisory Committee's
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (Investigative reports "are
admissible only in civil cases and against the government in criminal cases in view of the almost certain
collision with confrontation rights which would result from their use against the accused in a criminal
case.").

Indicia of Reliability
Several passages in Roberts indicate that statements falling within the public records and business
records exceptions will have no difficulty satisfying
the reliability requirement. In one passage, the Court
noted that "[r]eliability can be inferred without more
in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception." /d. The public and business records exceptions would seem to qualify as
"firmly rooted." See 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§
1517-61b (business records),§§ 1630-38a (public
records) (Chadbourn rev. 1974). In another passage
discussing reliability, the Court stated that "certain
hearsay exceptions rest on such solid foundations
that admission of virtually any evidence within them
comports with the 'substance of the constitutional
protection.'" 448 U.S. at 66, quoting Mattox v. U.S.,
156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895). In an accompanying footnote, the Court cited the business and public records
exceptions. /d. at 66 n.8.
Although it may be argued that business and public records generally bear adequate indicia of reliability, laboratory reports may not. The Laboratory
Proficiency Testing Program, sponsored by the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration, documented a startlingly high incidence of errors in analyses
performed by police laboratories. See J. Peterson, E.
Fabricant & K. Field, Crime Laboratory Proficiency
Testing Research Program (1978).
Unavailability of the Declarant
The unavailability requirement presents greater
difficulties. While establishing the unavailability of
the declarant is not a prerequisite for the admissibility of business and public records, Roberts "normally" requires a showing of unavailability. In Barber v.
Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), the Court wrote: "[A]
witness is not 'unavailable' for purposes of the ...
confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial

In upholding the admissibility of laboratory reports
in face of a constitutional challenge, a number of
courts have cited the defendant's failure to subpoena the analyst. E.g., U.S. v. Miller, 23 C.M.A. 247,
49 C.M.R. 380, 383 (1974); Burleson v. State, 585
S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. Crim. 1979). For example, in
State v. Spikes, 67 Ohio St. 2d 405,423 N.E.2d 1122
5

(1981), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1'131 (1982), the
court wrote that defense counsel "could have subpoenaed [the preparers] to testify at trial." /d. at 411,
423 N.E.2d at 1128. There is no support for this view
in Ohio v. Robwts; the Court never mentioned that
the defendant's failure to take steps to secure the
witness' attendance at trial was a significant factor.
Moreover, although the Court mentioned the defendant's right to call the declarant in Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74,88 n.19 (1970), the Court's confrontation
analysis did not rely on this factor.
As one commentator has noted:

Thus, failure to call the analyst should not be construed as a waiver of the right to confront him. See
Phillips v. Neal, 452 F.2d 337, 348-49 (6th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 (1972); Gregory v. State, 40
Md. App. 297, 328 n.28, 391 A.2d 437; 455 n.28 (1978).
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The danger here is that the defendant will find himself in
a dilemma: if he stands on the claim of error and refuses
to invoke his right of compulsory process to produce the
witness on his own initiative, the appellate court may
conclude that he never had a genuine interest in an inperson examination of the declarant; yet if the defendant tries to mitigate the injury by proceeding to produce and examine the witness on his own, the appellate
court may conclude that the prosecutor's error was
harmless. This dilemma is obviously unacceptable, because it would preclude defendants from ever successfully challenging a prosecutor's failure to take the initiative in producing a witness in person. Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567, 623-24
(1978).
.
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